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**GUIDED SOCIALIZATION:  
USING US INFLUENCE TO ESTABLISH  
AN INTER ELITE CULTURE OF COOPERATION IN EAST ASIA**

by

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
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
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## **Abstract**

The strategic rebalance of US power in East Asia, referred to as the Asia Pivot, lacks both defined objectives and a “road map” to success. We contend that the central objectives of US strategic policy in East Asia are the pursuit of economic growth and continued regional stability, not necessarily US regional hegemony. However, current US policy presents a schizophrenic narrative to East Asia, unconvincingly bridging the divide between alliance-centric containment, amorphous multilateral security, and indeterminate complex interdependence. Unlike constructivism, these three approaches to strategic engagement fail to acknowledge or adequately account for the broader cultural milieu of the region. In order to achieve the objectives of growth and stability in East Asia, we argue that the US Asia Pivot must focus attention on the underlying and enduring cultural identity fault lines in East Asia. To do so, the US must pursue the creation of functionally oriented supranational organizations, modeled after the integration that took place in Europe after the Second World War, that administrate geographic flashpoints as a foundation for a more comprehensive and enduring multilateral, regional security organization. The end state that supports US interests, in the long term, would require the creation of a Commons Command geared to provide the supranational defense and administration of common maritime regions that are not the sovereign territory of participants.



The end of the Cold War and subsequent expansion of globalization has subjected East Asia to rapid and disruptive change. Ideological transitions, economic booms and busts, and religio-ethnic and nationalist tensions throughout the region now challenge the basic strategic posture of the US and how it relates to emerging and current regional powers. As a result, the Obama administration has espoused the Asia Pivot as a strategic effort to rebalance forces and demonstrate US commitment to East Asia. However, though the current administration has pledged a renewed commitment to the development of the region, it has failed to articulate and describe either a specific way ahead or a desirable strategic end-state.

We contend that the central objectives of US strategic policy in East Asia are the pursuit of economic growth and continued regional stability, not necessarily US regional hegemony. However, current US policy presents a schizophrenic narrative to East Asia, unconvincingly bridging the divide between alliance-centric containment, amorphous multilateral security, and indeterminate complex interdependence. Unlike constructivism, these three approaches to strategic engagement fail to acknowledge or adequately account for the broader cultural milieu of the region. In order to achieve the objectives of growth and stability in East Asia, we argue that the US Asia Pivot must focus attention on the underlying and enduring cultural identity fault lines in East Asia. To do so the US must pursue the creation of functionally oriented supranational organizations that administrate geographic flashpoints as a foundation for a more comprehensive and enduring multilateral, regional security organization. The end state that supports US interests, in the long term, would require the creation of a Commons Command geared to provide the supranational defense and administration of common maritime regions that are not the sovereign territory of participants.

Since the end of the Cold War, the US has embraced East Asian policy founded on three theoretical frameworks: realism, neoliberalism, and neoliberal institutionalism. International relations theory, regardless of the theoretical persuasion, values parsimony in the identification and thorough dissection of explanatory variables. However, the development and application of effective policy when accounting for the complexities of the human systems involved requires a more holistic approach. Though each theoretical perspective employed by policy makers, often in an uncomplimentary fashion, carries academic value, we argue in the following sections that each theoretical approach produces fatally flawed policy when applied to the East Asian context. In contrast, unlike international relations theories that espouse deterministic variables, constructivism offers an ontology, or system of knowing.<sup>1</sup> This said, policy that acknowledges a constructivist perspective is faced with navigating a nebulous arrangement of variables with little guidance as to how to achieve desirable effects. For this paper, we reanimate the basic tenets of neo-functionalism, an area of scholarship, conceptual-theoretical writing, and actual policy action that came to life in the post-WW II institution-building experiments of post-modern Europe, including the forerunners of today's European Union. However, we approach neo-functionalism not as a theoretical approach to international relations, but as a modality meant to inform the development and implementation of policy guided by the theoretical milieu of constructivism.

### ***Realism in a dynamic and unpredictable environment***

Realist theory suggests that the creation and maintenance of a balance of power amongst states will achieve stability. However, policy based on realism in East Asia fails to lead to a desirable strategic end-state for three critical reasons. First, realist power balancing, especially in the East Asian context, is by its nature an acultural construct and thus unnecessarily provocative

and destabilizing. In other words, realism treats the preservation and pursuit of power as ends onto themselves while making no accommodation for the cultural context of such pursuits. While this acultural perspective provides utility when a cultural and regional perspective is unavailable, it fails to account for the contextually influenced cognition of individuals in a social environment. Second, stability induced by realism requires a stable and accurate assessment of hard power capacity amongst regional actors. However, rapid changes in technology exacerbate instability by continually changing the perceived balance of power. Third, the peculiar geography of East Asia, to include a concentration of sea lines of communication and disputed island chains, establishes a physical zero-sum game where, in the absence of cooperation, some actors necessarily gain at the expense of others.

Realists contend that states will engage in bandwagoning behavior and alliance creation in order to pursue a balance of power arrangement. For example, following the Second World War, the US established the San Francisco system of hub-and-spoke bilateral alliances in East Asia. This alliance network served to both entrench US influence in the region and, throughout the Cold War, contain the expansion of communism. This legacy system endures today, centered squarely on the US-Japan and US-Korea alliances. For example, the Clinton administration maintained a commitment to keep at least 100,000 troops deployed to East Asia, ostensibly to assuage any fears from allies that US support would wane in the future.<sup>2</sup> Years later, after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the Bush administration strengthened its alliances with the Philippines and Thailand, deepened its connection with Singapore with respect to counterterrorism, and reestablished a basic military relationship with Indonesia.<sup>3</sup> Though these alliances, from a US perspective, reassure allies and maintain stability, policy makers must view

this strategic posture from a regional perspective that includes the perceptions and values of those states they wish to successfully influence.

The strategic culture of China, one of the principal actors the US seeks to influence, places significant value on “active defense” and territorial integrity.<sup>4</sup> Further, the “century of humiliation” at the hands of Western powers during the colonial era and at the hands of Japan during World War II engendered a deep-rooted need for robust deterrence in the national psyche of China.<sup>5</sup> It is difficult for Western observers to incorporate this powerful affective component of Chinese territorial defense into the US perception of its own basic power-balance calculation. Yet, from a Chinese perspective, this policy aim has remained remarkably consistent through three generations of Chinese national leadership, from Mao to Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jin Tao.

For example, China’s official policy with respect to nuclear weapons reveals the depth and consistency of China’s desire for strategic defense. Deng Xiaoping in 1975 stated, “Our reason for building a few [nuclear weapons] is that we will have them if they have them. Nuclear weapons have only this function.”<sup>6</sup> Thus, China diverted, as a percentage of GNP, significant resources to develop and achieve a nuclear deterrent in response to a perceived strategic weakness. This level of commitment reveals the powerful influence that territorial integrity and the desire to reduce relative weakness has on Chinese strategic thinking. Over 40 years later, in 2006, China continued to promote “a self-defensive nuclear strategy” and “maintain a nuclear strategic deterrent” as part of its official nuclear policy.<sup>7</sup> Generally, much of China’s ancient history and, more recently, the 20<sup>th</sup> century served as a palpable reminder that there is little substitute for strength in the quest for security. Moreover, this deeply rooted national desire to protect the nation from attack complicates the cold calculation of realists seeking a balance-of-power via the deployment and distribution of US troops and bilateral alliances.

Changes in technology further complicate the pursuit of stability. Realists manage the security dilemma by successfully establishing and communicating hard power parity amongst regional actors. Realism does not offer a solution to the security dilemma beyond the management of relative power. In the past, assessments of hard power were relatively simple quantitative efforts. States compared numbers of ships, tanks, troops, or steel production capacity to determine the relative strength, in a military sense, of a potential adversary. Unfortunately, for proponents of policy influenced by realism the technological, economic and social changes of the 21<sup>st</sup> century make the determination of actual hard power capacity amongst actors a difficult, if nearly impossible, task. For example, China has officially confirmed the existence of a hypersonic missile system specifically designed to deliver a warhead at speeds between Mach 5 and 10.<sup>8</sup> US defense experts have quietly acknowledged that this hypersonic missile technology represents a technological leap forward that reduces the credibility of US missile defense.<sup>9</sup> This development is emblematic of the type of destabilizing technologies that, once introduced, can rapidly alter the balance of power in a region. Further, rapid changes that produce a power dichotomy, even if only perceived ones, may induce an actor to behave in an unexpected or aggressive manner with potentially devastating results.

Alarming, changes in technology force policy makers to ask new and, at times, unsettling questions regarding the assessment of hard power parity. For example, how will states measure power in the cyber domain? What asymmetric technologies will eliminate the relevance of previous investments in military hardware, e.g. how the aircraft carrier made the battleship obsolete in the 20<sup>th</sup> century? The answers to these questions are critical to preserving the balance of power required by realist policy. The more likely outcome of a realist approach to balance of power pursuits, especially in East Asia in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, is the emergence of a potentially



dangerous and destabilizing arms race. Unfortunately, this type of hyper-competition occurs against a backdrop of overlapping concepts of territorial integrity.

The peculiar geography of East Asia exacerbates the perception of a zero-sum game. Territorial disputes in the region include (and this is not an exhaustive list) the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands dispute between China and Japan, the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands dispute amongst Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam, and the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands dispute between Korea and Japan.<sup>10</sup> Further, these disputes also influence access to strategic sea lines of communication (SLOC) and overlapping claims to exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the region, the latter of which often also include oil and natural gas energy supplies. Without an overarching cooperative arrangement in the region, state actors are likely to pursue their self-interest (in this case guaranteed access to disputed islands and the resources around them) at the expense of other actors. This scenario represents the basic zero sum problem of international relations. The application of policies intended to solve territorial disputes based in realism by any regional actor in East Asia creates, by default, winners and losers. For example, China has recently provoked neighboring states with its declaration of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) that encompasses the South China Sea.<sup>11</sup> Further, Japan, Korea, and China have all allowed nationalist elements to “solidify” their respective claims to disputed islands through construction of improvements or settlements on islands themselves.<sup>12</sup> Any of these actions could pit nationalist factions against each other, thereby introducing an unpredictable and destabilizing variable into the conflict avoidance equation. Overall, when one of the losers in an island chain dispute fails to acquiesce to the new normal, conflict is a predictable outcome.

Thus, we suggest that a realist approach that emphasizes containment and balancing does not adequately account for the modern geo-political environment in East Asia. As Michael Kraig has noted, “In the Cold War there were no or few overlapping strategic concerns or interests, due to the sharp rupture in political and socio-economic ideologies between capitalism and communism.”<sup>13</sup> In other words, a Cold War paradigm that uses bilateral alliances as a source of containment is not fully compatible with actual conditions in East Asia. Further, western observers often misunderstand the political reality in China.

Communism has been replaced with a more pragmatic, adaptive and yet authoritarian Confucian-style bureaucracy.<sup>14</sup> Though the US and China share significant economic interdependence, a diplomatic strategy of the US that promotes containment as its central objective communicates a perceived structural and ideological incompatibility similar to the one that existed between the Soviet Union and the US in the Cold War. Differences remain between China and much of the Western world, notably with respect to political speech and human rights, but they are not insurmountable obstacles. If the US seeks to influence the political changes taking place in China, it cannot do so using a strategy of containment. For the US, the use of bilateral agreements and alliances to isolate and power balance in East Asia constitutes a schizophrenic presentation of strategy, given high levels of interdependence in other areas.

### ***Neoliberalism and complex interdependence: An Attempt to Grow Together***

In contrast with the containment effect implied by bilateral alliances, neoliberal policy attempts to integrate the pacifying influence of complex interdependence. US neoliberal policy suggests that economic dynamism in East Asia is the key to developing new norms of behaviors and expectations amongst state actors. Neoliberal theory contends that deep economic integration has a deterministic effect on political culture, as well as the basic norms and expectations of

actors in the international system. In essence, neoliberalism attempts to unite the long-term desires of individuals and groups across the boundaries of states using economic integration. Moreover, neoliberal theory assumes that, at their core, all individuals regardless of cultural foundation pursue similar ends, namely freedom, opportunity and security. In turn, the desire of individuals and groups for continued stability, economic growth, and mutual gain diffuse into the political culture of states thereby producing cooperative, amenable, and predictable behavior. This basic theoretical foundation explains the commitment of the US, and in turn its allies, to use most favored nation (MNF), free trade agreements, and direct foreign investment as elements of both economic and political integration in East Asia. For example, William Overholt suggests that US strategic interests in East Asia are the continued “economic growth, continued economic liberalization, continued political consolidation, continued but slow political liberalization” and limited military development of China.<sup>15</sup>

However, despite the existence of significant economic integration throughout East Asia, when states are subject to stressors, to include economic recession or religio-ethnic tension, elites often resort to fomenting nationalism and the use of bellicose rhetoric to consolidate domestic political power.<sup>16</sup> For example, following economic calamities in the early 1990s, the Japanese political landscape witnessed to a resurgent nationalism that expressed both a revisionist view of World War II and encouraged a more unrestrained military posture, despite prohibitions in the Japanese constitution.<sup>17</sup> Importantly, this process is not limited to Japan. Nationalist and anti-Great Power movements within multiple regional actors have emerged at various times in response to either domestic crises or perceived threats throughout East Asia, to include Taiwan<sup>18</sup>, Indonesia,<sup>19</sup> and China.<sup>20</sup> Whether economic interdependence can reduce the destabilizing

influence of nationalism in East Asia through changes in political culture remains a central question.

There is evidence that economic integration does have an observable influence on the political culture of East Asian actors. However, here we find a significant and enduring regional fault line to which neoliberal policy has little response. David Hale identified shifting political attitudes in Australia from 1996 to 2004, where Australian public opinion transitioned from supporting US involvement in a conflict over Taiwan, to preferring no US involvement.<sup>21</sup> This transition in attitudes developed as China has become the primary destination for Australian raw material exports. However, though this change in Australian attitude supports the neoliberal perspective regarding economic integration, the Sino-Japan relationship is a counter indicator. In 2004, Japan was China's largest Asian trading partner, accounting for approximately 16 percent of China's total trade.<sup>22</sup> In turn, "China accounted for 22 percent of Japan's total trade."<sup>23</sup> Despite this robust economic relationship, general mistrust and fear between China and Japan remains. As Thomas Christensen points out, "China's basic distrust of Japan has been transferred to the economic realm."<sup>24</sup> Christensen further reveals that, though World War II is a distant memory for China's youth, these same young people hold an intensely negative opinion of Japanese society, commonly describing Japanese business people as "unreliable, selfish, and slimy."<sup>25</sup> This variance between popular attitudes amongst actors and their cultural context, e.g. China-Japan or Australia-China, reveal the powerful legacy of historical scars between East Asian actors. Further reducing the effectiveness of neoliberal policy, economic integration occurs amongst social systems, not just individuals.

Political economic structures in East Asia further undermine the predicted effects of neoliberalism in East Asia. For example, as Japan and China have both extended their economic

influence throughout the region, the effect has been to increase perceived injustice and exclusiveness. For example, the Japanese economy utilized a post Second World War reconstruction model that relied heavily on integration of the political and economic spheres in Japan's overall domestic system.<sup>26</sup> The result was an unusual political-economic structure that remained disproportionately closed to foreign investment and steeped in protectionism when compared to other smaller regional actors.<sup>27</sup> For example, two thirds of China's foreign investment comes from other Asian powers.<sup>28</sup> Yet, Japan has never allowed this level of regional integration with its economy.<sup>29</sup> The dichotomy that exists between and amongst the economic systems of East Asian actors further exacerbates general mistrust and thwarts the process of deeper economic integration. This process indicates that economic interaction, especially at the system-to-system level, may not be sufficient to alter attitudes and biases between states if such interaction plays out in an environment where fair economic access is not a guarantee in the future.

The predilection of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in East Asia describes another economic access issue. The current economic engagement policy of the US, and in turn many East Asian actors, has focused on bilateral FTAs as an attempt to gain economic interdependence. However, this regional economic structure limits the successful diffusion of stabilizing economic interaction and instead promotes the perception of an economic zero-sum game at the level of strategic and political culture.<sup>30</sup> These bilateral FTAs reduce small state access to the regional marketplace and destabilize overall buy-in to the system by exaggerating the influence of major powers, such as Japan and China.<sup>31</sup> Further, Daniel Rosen points out that though some motivation exists to create an effective East Asian economic order, similar in structure to NAFTA, powerful East Asian actors, including Japan, Korea and China, are hedging

their bets with an increased emphasis on bilateral FTAs, to include many forged outside the East Asian region.<sup>32</sup> This, in some sense, is an attempt to control both access to and the standards used in the regional marketplace. For example, it is feasible that a state actor with a dominant economic position and a significant number of complementary FTAs (read China or Japan) could dictate the terms by which the underlying economic order in the region operates. In other words, by engaging in bilateral economic deals, the US and other powerful regional actors communicate that the economic system, as it exists, rewards both a zero-sum mentality and those actors with the power and motivation to exploit such a system. This is an unfortunate development when the US is attempting to develop buy-in to an open market system for rising powers in East Asia.

Though bilateral FTAs have their strategic perils, economic partnerships, though promising conceptually, also present unique challenges. Strategic partnerships that seek to strengthen economic ties and development require the deft management of expectations and policy goals between participants. However, when they fail or change dramatically, partnerships and alliances can have a dramatic negative influence on regional stability. For example, the partnership between the United States and China during the late 1990s, was susceptible to “conflicting expectations about the nature of their embryonic strategic partnership ... each side was disturbed by the other’s failure to abide by what it believed were the basic ground rules.”<sup>33</sup> Strain or termination of partnerships reduces the benefits of economic interconnectedness by placing the economic environment in a state of significant structural flux.

As a result, regional actors have clamored for a more robust and stable economic and political forum, especially one less susceptible to the shifting sands of constant major power posturing, to unite the East Asian region.<sup>34</sup> Overall, the structural foundation upon which economic interaction and interdependence occurs influences their relative effect.

Thus, when set against a backdrop of bilateral agreements, the interaction of bilateral agreements and isolated political-economic structures produce destabilizing effects despite the influence of complex interdependence. In response, neoliberal institutionalism, in theory, provides an avenue to ameliorate the security dilemma at the heart of potential conflict in East Asia using structural institutional relationships.

### ***Neoliberal Institutionalism in East Asia: A Bridge Too Far***

Neoliberal institutionalism, gleaning heavily from the experience of post Second World War reconstruction in Europe, suggests that actors modify behavioral norms and expectations if influenced and constrained by a supranational organization. However, multilateral institutions in East Asia have failed to grow beyond a relatively immature stage of development when compared to Western Europe. Three key provisions help explain this divergence in outcomes.

First, the development of multilateral institutions in East Asia did not effectively heal the wounds of past aggression as they did in Europe. For example, during the Cold War the US supported the creation of the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). However, policy makers never intended to support the development of a parallel to NATO in East Asia.<sup>35</sup> By design, initial attempts at establishing multilateralism in East Asia were hamstrung when compared to efforts in Europe. As Hemmer and Katzenstein point out, “While US policymakers may have acted condescendingly to their European partners, in comparison to their Asian allies, it was condescension tempered by the expectation of Europe’s revival. Indeed, much of US policy toward Europe was driven by the perception of the European states as great powers.”<sup>36</sup> Thus, multilateral structures, namely NATO, developed in Europe allowing Germany to shed its pariah status. In contrast, no such structure existed to facilitate the reintegration of Japan into the East Asian community.

Second, great powers use multilateral institutions in East Asia, not as providing value in and of themselves, but rather to facilitate bilateral engagement and power balancing. For example, Brendan Taylor points out that the Shangri-La Dialogue is an annual gathering held in Singapore that attracts a multitude of policymakers from around the region not because of its multilateral agenda but because it facilitates bilateral engagement on the sidelines.<sup>37</sup> If the intent of neoliberal institutionalism is to influence the behavior of states through the introduction and development of new norms of behavior, then using multilateral forums in East Asia to accomplish bilateral engagement is hardly a departure from the current norm. Further, multilateral forums do not necessarily communicate cooperation. Instead, they present a forum through which great powers negotiate a delicate balance between great power assurance and competition.<sup>38</sup> For example, China has floated support for a security concept using the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in an attempt “to steer East Asian multilateralism towards constraining US power.”<sup>39</sup> Evelyn Goh summarizes well when she states, “Instead of emphasizing the difficult task of balancing against US power directly, China aims to reshape the incentive structure of its neighbors so that *they* (emphasis in original) would not become complicit in a putative attempt by the US to contain China.”<sup>40</sup> Thus, the very essence of a multilateral institution, and thus its influence on regional security and cooperation, changes when it is a veil for traditional bilateralism and great power balancing.

Third, multilateral organizations in East Asia are loose conglomerates that largely fail to deliver demonstrable results. For example, Ajin Choi and William Tow point out that, “The ARF exemplifies what was previously a relatively tight system to ASEAN members engaging in bilateral dialogues on mostly economic issues blowing out to include most regional and several extra-regional actors pursuing arguably amorphous goals of preventative diplomacy and



comprehensive security in diverse and, at times, contradictory ways.”<sup>41</sup> Choi and Tow go on to suggest that the membership rolls and nature of the issues at the center of a multilateral organization are critical components of the overall effectiveness of that organization.<sup>42</sup> In other words, a large and ambiguous organization will have less relevance than an organization with focused purpose and membership. For example, East Asian attitudes toward multilateral organizations, notably those organizations with a perceived influence from extra-regional actors, trended toward suspicion following the Asia financial crisis of 1997. During the crisis, the impotent response of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the perceived intrusive response by the IMF led to a rupture in the expectations about regionally oriented organizations and the failure of broader organizations to serve the interests of East Asia.<sup>43</sup> In other words, bloated membership rolls and competing interests left APEC unable to produce results. Thus, the multilateral experience in East Asia has proved, thus far, incapable or unwilling to meet the needs of regional actors in a structurally meaningful way.

Overall, each theoretical perspective fails to amend the deep underlying identity and animosity issues that still plague East Asia. That is not to say that each approach does not have value; far from it. Moreover, constructivism does not require policy makers wholly reject the underlying assumptions and prescribed relationships between critical variables of most IR theory. Instead, policy makers must use each theoretical approach in concert with the others to produce a desirable “net effect” on the complex human systems in question. Moving forward, we describe how a functional approach unites essential aspects of each perspective while simultaneously acknowledging the truly critical variable in the region, cultural identity.

### ***Guided Socialization in East Asia***

Policy elites often tout the regional security apparatus in Europe, the European Union, as a desirable goal for East Asia to emulate. However, policy elites tend to advocate for grand designs of multilateral institutions without accounting for the process needed to develop acceptance for such organizations. In other words, policy makers all too often fail to account for the cognitive dimension of group formation and identity. Constructivism would argue that this process of socialization is critical in determining how states will behave in the international system. Thus, functionalism, a concept rooted in the tenets of sociology, provides a mechanism to influence group identity. It does so in two distinct ways.

First, appropriately designed functional solutions present participants with a superordinate goal. Simply put, a superordinate goal is a problem that afflicts two groups but requires cooperation to solve effectively.<sup>44</sup> In a classic sociological study that presented the superordinate goal concept, Sherif states, “In a conflict between two groups ... opinion within the groups is crystallized, slogans are formulated, and effective measures are organized by members recognized as the most responsible in their respective groups.”<sup>45</sup> In other words, Sherif describes the process through which the “in vs. out” group schema both emerges and changes based on the presence of external stressors (the superordinate goal) and internal affect (the “us” and “we” demarcation.) Though sociology does not explicitly attempt to describe the behavior of states, in this context, the connection between the behavior of a “group” in conflict and the behavior of a “state,” especially in the East Asia context where group identity is so powerfully manifest, seems a question of merely semantic distinction. Sherif goes on to identify the power of the superordinate goal in changing inter-group attitudes:

The introduction of a series of such superordinate goals was indeed effective in reducing intergroup conflict: (1) when the groups in a state of friction interacted in conditions involving superordinate goals, they did co-operate in activities leading toward the common goal and (2) a series of joint activities leading toward

superordinate goals had the cumulative effect of reducing the prevailing friction between groups and unfavorable stereotypes toward the out-group.<sup>46</sup>

In some sense, this process provides for the tangible manifestation of the benefits of a “positive sum game” as it relates to group-to-group interaction.

The second mechanism by which a functional approach influences group identity is through the stable and predictable administration of behavior with a robust form of confidence building measures (CBMs). CBMs are not unique to the functional approach. However, CBMs take on a more powerful affective quality under a functional apparatus because they are not merely displays of action but are systems of amicable interaction for past belligerents. In other words, functionally oriented organizations allow new successes to replace historical animosities. If, as in East Asia, the enduring obstacle centers on past aggression and perceived mistrust, then this process of confidence building through successful interaction is indispensable to stability.

Policy elites who endeavor to construct a durable and stabilizing security apparatus in East Asia often tout European integration as an example of their desired end state. Yet, the resounding and, as of yet, durable integration of Europe employed the functional approach so often overlooked by those same policy elites. In the following section, we will illuminate how a cooperative perspective, coupled with a conception of shared sovereignty contributed to significant change in regional affect.

In May of 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman “proposed that Franco-German coal and steel production be placed under a common High Authority within the framework of an organization in which other European countries could participate.”<sup>47</sup> In turn, by 1951 the Treaty of Paris officially established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Policy advocates purposefully selected the steel industry for a supranational functional administration because of its demonstrated historical legacy as a point of friction amongst great

powers in Europe. Overall, the ECSC sought to establish a “common market by ensuring equal access to the sources of production, the establishment of the lowest prices and improved working conditions.”<sup>48</sup> According to the EUs official web portal, an ever expanding and integrating political and economic structure followed the emergence of the ECSC Treaty.<sup>49</sup>

The ECSC was a critical component for the eventual development of a broader European security cooperative, not in so far as it produced substantive results, but in that it represented the ideation of cooperation, that is, the strategic-cultural formation of cooperative beliefs, habits, and norms among European leaders. In particular/specifically, three critical observations explain the overarching success of the ECSC. First, the ECSC established a forum to modulate nationalism through the guided contact and interaction of previous adversaries, i.e. a robust CBM. Second, the ECSC was able, broadly speaking, to administrate what had been a zero sum game in Europe, thereby reducing the divergence between winners and losers in the competitive steel industry, i.e. a superordinate goal. Third, the ECSC and its subsequent expansion into deeper political and economic integration received both implicit and explicit support from an external hegemon, in this case the US, who provided stability during the transition.<sup>50</sup> The obvious question now is how to incorporate the lessons of the ECSC into a regionally appropriate construct in East Asia.

### ***Supranational Island Chain Administration: A Functional Approach***

The development of a supranational functional approach to regional integration in East Asia requires four areas of analysis: (1) selection of an appropriate issue for supranational administration, (2) the selection of a specific problem relating to that issue area, along with the principal actors involved, (3) an assessment of the needs of those actors, and (4) required changes to existing US policy in the region to support the “net effect” of the functional approach.

First, the ECSC Treaty targeted steel production because it was both a source of power and friction in Europe. In an East Asian context, island chain disputes are similar in nature. As mentioned previously, friction exists between multiple actors in the region because an island chain dispute represents, at its core, a zero sum game between participants. As Baviera points out, “There are common stakes and interests in both the territorial and maritime jurisdiction disputes [in East Asia]: access to resources (in particular fisheries, and oil and gas), security against potentially hostile neighbors, influence over strategic sea lanes, and – not least of all – national pride.”<sup>51</sup> Indeed, as this example demonstrates, the issue of island chain disputes in fact incorporates and encompasses many issue sub-areas of significant contention: sovereign territorial identity claims; economic resource claims; and the ability to ensure access to the global economy.

Attempts at bilateral maritime dispute resolution are not without precedent in East Asia. Baviera identified a de-escalation of hostilities between China and Vietnam after 17 rounds of Gulf of Tonkin talks. “The two sides agreed to a series of measures to prevent further incidents and enhance cooperation in the area.”<sup>52</sup> Baviera continues, “Bilateral dialogue also helped the claimants recognize that cooperative solutions can avoid the question of sovereignty, challenging the traditional zero sum approach.”<sup>53</sup> In essence, joint economic ventures in the maritime environment produced positive results for participants without the inherent costs of hostile competition. Yet, this type of bilateral interaction is subject to the animosities and perceptions of participants. Despite the apparent successful negotiation between China and Vietnam, two other maritime disputes (China-Philippines and China-Japan) failed to achieve measurable results after initial bilateral engagement.<sup>54</sup>

Thus, direct bilateral engagement, without the support of an external hegemon, lacks the durability required to establish enduring solutions. A functional approach to island chain disputes, conceptually, ensures continued access to critical resources while simultaneously providing a forum to placate the demands of national pride over time.

In the second area of analysis, it is critical to select the appropriate actors to participate in the supranational organization. Thus, policy makers require an island chain dispute where the US has the influence and resources in place to support the formation and maintenance of the organization. Amongst current island chain disputes, we suggest that the ongoing dispute between Japan and Korea over the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands is an appropriate selection for three reasons. First, both Japan and Korea rely on US reassurances for their basic security needs. For example, with US support and despite entrenched fractures in identity and culture, the Trilateral Security Dialogue established in 2002 amongst Japan, Korea and the US is a potentially profound development.<sup>55</sup> Second, the US still maintains significant social influence in both Japan and Korea. For example, according to a RAND study of Korean attitudes toward the US, despite a downturn in favorability assessments of the US in Korea based on emotional events, the overarching security environment on the Korean peninsula still engenders a favorable opinion, overall, of the US across a broad polity.<sup>56</sup> Similarly, a Pew Global research analysis revealed that Japanese attitudes toward the US over almost a decade, from 1993 to 2002, increased from 37% regarding relations as good, to almost three quarters holding a favorable view of the US.<sup>57</sup> Third, and most plainly, the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands dispute is bilateral. One of the principle critiques of multilateral engagement in East Asia, as noted in this paper, is that membership rolls of multilateral organizations in the region tend to swell and become unfocused and overly complicated through the introduction of competing needs and perspectives. Thus, it is critical, in

an initial attempt at a durable functionally oriented organization, to proceed with focused participation. Overall, the Takeshima/Dokdo Island dispute presents a viable starting point for functional problem solving in East Asia.

In the third area of analysis, both Japan and Korea have a stake in the development of enduring solutions to the island dispute and the broader East Asia security order. It is axiomatic that integrated and economically developed actors like Japan and Korea have an interest in stability as well as access to markets and resources. Yet, the desire for an expanded and integrated security apparatus speaks to both the long-term goals and deeper identity issues of both actors. Broadly, policy elites in both Korea and Japan have publicly espoused a desire for a more robust and meaningful security apparatus in East Asia. For example, Korean president Kim Dae-jung, in power from 1998 to 2003, made committed efforts “to enhance regional economic and politico-security integration.”<sup>58</sup> This regionally integrated trajectory continued for Korea, only modified to present a continued commitment to the US alliance as well, with the election of Lee Myong-bak in 2008.<sup>59</sup> Korea’s interest in the establishment of an integrated security order rests on its proximate position between two significant power transitions, China’s rise and Japan’s proposed reintegration into the East Asia security order as a more independent actor. A functional approach has the capacity to influence both such transitions.

Similarly, Japanese policy elites supported the creation of the East Asian Community (EAC) as a forum to integrate actors into a multilateral forum. However, the process received little support, and at times, outright opposition from the US over its amorphous nature and from China based on regional identity issues.<sup>60</sup> In all, Japan’s desire to reintegrate, in a meaningful way, to the East Asian order has a powerful affective quality. Kazuhiko Togo sums up both the motivation and dilemma for Japan well:

The EAC cannot be understood properly without an appreciation of the fact that Japan is trying to regain the Asian identity it lost after its defeat in August 1945. But in Japan that defeat also resulted in a contradiction between complete negativism toward the country's prewar activities and a legitimate desire to protect its honor. Japan's inability to resolve this contradiction is creating a crisis of national identity. The two approaches on which it has staked its search for identity – “reentering Asia” and “reestablishing national values” – are on a collision course.<sup>61</sup>

G. John Ikenberry points out that the normalization of Japan's sovereignty and security is an inevitable process.<sup>62</sup> “The debate within establishment circles has been about providing Japan with a legal basis for participation in “collective security” within the framework of the US-Japan alliance and the United Nations.”<sup>63</sup> In this regard, a functionally oriented organization supported by the US accomplishes the dual pronged goal of legitimizing Japanese integration while allowing for a normalized presentation of Japanese military forces in the region.

In the fourth area of analysis, the US must adapt its bilateral rigidity to allow for increased integration in East Asia. Currently, the US-Japan alliance is the cornerstone for the strategic presentation of US power in the region. However, if Ikenberry's assessment of this security arrangement is accurate, then Japan's inevitable reassertion of sovereignty warrants a timely adaptation to the alliance. Kent Calder suggests that a model for the US-Japan alliance in the future should mirror the growth and development of the US-German relationship since 1955.<sup>64</sup> Calder concludes that the selection of the US-German paradigm is “natural because the challenges that the US-German relationship has historically confronted are probably most similar to those of the US-Japan alliance.”<sup>65</sup> With this in mind, the US encouraged the reintegration of the German pariah after World War II through, in what we assess, was *a process of guided socialization*. Organizations like the ECSC and NATO provided a forum for interaction under the auspices of an external hegemon (the US) in response to a superordinate goal (balancing the



Warsaw Pact.) Thus, the practical implication for the US is that the guided socialization process – structurally supported with a functionally oriented organization – also requires a long-term if not generational commitment to deep diplomatic and social integration amongst former belligerents, notably Korea and Japan.<sup>66</sup> Moreover, the US does not need to alter its commitment to the strategic defense of Japan, but instead must also clearly communicate that its role in the supranational organization is the successful administration of the disputed maritime commons regardless of Japanese interest.

The US-Korea alliance, in terms of adapting to the introduction of a functional supranational organization, requires less affective change. North Korea remains Korea's visceral security challenge. Similar to the basic strategic commitment to Japan, the US must continue to honor its commitment to Korea to defend against North Korean aggression. Beyond this basic bilateral security principle, during its dramatic economic rise Korea has pursued a balanced trade policy so "it cannot be blackmailed or manipulated by any one partner."<sup>67</sup> In a sense, this practice demonstrates the willingness of Korea to act, as it perceives its own interests, in a multilateral fashion. Thus, amendments to US policy that incorporate the requirements of a functionally oriented supranational organization need only preserve commitments to defend against North Korea while engendering a common approach to administering disputed areas.

Overall, the functional model we propose for a supranational organization in East Asia has four distinct characteristics. First, an island chain dispute provides, structurally speaking, a zero sum game that, if cooperatively managed, presents a superordinate goal that encourages socialization with the support of an external hegemon. Second, the Takeshima/Dokdo Island dispute between Japan and Korea is a logical selection for engagement because the US retains significant influence with both actors and the dispute is bilateral in nature. Third, both Japan and

Korea have expressed a desire to establish a regional security order and act multilaterally. The functional approach is an appropriate mechanism to make this existing strategic cultural vision a reality. Fourth, US policy toward both allies must communicate a continued commitment to their territorial integrity while also engendering a new commitment to cooperative engagement in support of maritime dispute resolution. These efforts, in the summary, provide a stable environment in which directed socialization occurs and actors bridge cultural identity rifts in the region.

### ***Conclusions and thoughts on the future***

The enduring obstacle to regional security integration in East Asia is fragmented cultural animosity. Historical legacies, divergent agendas and hyper-competition all engender a general mistrust toward integration. Realists fail to engage this principle issue. Cultural aversion and sensitivities to physical attack, coupled with dramatic changes in technology and the dynamic geography of the region, all encourage further instability in the region if realist policies remain the centerpiece of international engagement. Neoliberal complex interdependence at least acknowledges the cognitive influence on the behavior of individuals and groups. However, in East Asia, structural economic incongruities, competing expectations regarding norms and interests, and enduring messages of mistrust all ameliorate the prescribed effects of interdependence. Neoliberal institutionalism, in East Asia, represents a bridge too far for most regional actors. The loose, amorphous nature of current East Asia forums fails to reassure weaker actors, often encourages great power balancing, and has the capacity to obfuscate the strategic intentions of actors.

In response, a lesson from European history and the development of cooperative security offers hope. The functionally oriented approach integrated, economically and politically, former

adversaries using the ECSC. This development represented a modality to influence affective change within the cultural milieu of constructivism. If the US hopes to manage the transition of two major regional actors, namely the rise of China and reintegration of Japan, guided socialization is essential. However, this is not an end state. The Asia Pivot must express this initial functional approach as a first phase. Subsequent commitments should establish similar arrangements amongst regional actors involved in other maritime disputes, such as the Spratly's and the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands. The end state that supports US interests, in the long term, would require the creation of a Commons Command conceptually similar to NATO yet geared to provide the supranational defense and administration of common maritime regions that will not necessarily be the sovereign territory of participants. If this is the end state, the first step is a functional approach.

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